World War One And The 'Short-War Illusion'

By Professor David Stevenson

In August 1914 German Emperor Wilhelm II famously promised to his departing troops that they would return before the autumn leaves fell.

Yet most of Europe's military chiefs did not, in fact, expect a short war.

The Chief of the German General Staff had predicted a struggle lasting between 18 months and two years. His French and Austrian opposite numbers took a similar view.

A clash between two great alliance blocs, each fielding armies that numbered millions and were supported by the resources of entire nations, would not be settled in weeks. 

Even the direst military predictions, however, failed to foresee a conflict lasting four and a half years that would claim at least 10 million lives.

Lord Kitchener warned the Cabinet of a drawn-out bloodbath in Europe

And civilian politicians seem not to have been informed about the military leaders' pessimism.

When Europe's governments decided for war, they expected heavy casualties, but nothing resembling what actually occurred.

Lord Kitchener, the colonial hero who was brought in as Britain's Secretary of State for War, stunned the Cabinet by warning them to prepare for a three-year bloodbath.

And as for members of the ordinary public, evidence from diaries and letters suggests that many really did expect a struggle that would last only a few months.

Newspaper sellers in the run-up to war on August 1, 1914

Much of this optimism may have been wishful thinking. And research by historians has made clear that 'war enthusiasm' was skin-deep.

To be sure, there was excitement, and cheering crowds gathered round the royal palaces in Berlin and London, but these demonstrations were quite small, composed mostly of well-to-do young men, and most prominent after war had been declared.

Up until then, pacifist and anti-war protests rivalled them - for example in Trafalgar Square as late as Sunday August 2, only two days before Britain came in.

British soldiers in a shallow trench during the Battle of the Somme

On 31 July the London Stock Exchange was closed for the first time in its history, due to a run on the Bank of England's gold reserves and sell-offs of government bonds across Europe, while both in Britain and on the Continent queues formed outside savings banks and there was panic food-buying.

Although The Times consistently advocated British intervention, The Manchester Guardian remained unconvinced, and many civilian diarists expressed anxiety and foreboding.

In all the combatant countries political parties suspended their differences for the duration of the war effort.

But it seems to have been only later, once reports came in of heavy fighting and massive casualties, that a deeper pro-war consensus formed on both sides.

The public had not begun this business, but now they were in it they would see it through.

In Britain, hundreds of thousands flocked to the recruiting offices in late August and September. Although the volunteers had many motives, patriotism was certainly one of them.

And even after the campaigning bogged down into opposing lines of trenches, many still (without the benefit of hindsight) expected it to carry on for only a few more months. The short-war illusion did not end in 1914.

:: Professor David Stevenson is the author of With Our Backs To The Wall: Victory And Defeat in 1918, and 1914-1918: The History Of The First World War. He teaches at London School of Economics & Political Science

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